In 2009, I became extremely concerned with the concept of Unique Identity for various reasons. Connected with many like minded highly educated people who were all concerned.
On 18th May 2010, I started this Blog to capture anything and everything I came across on the topic. This blog with its million hits is a testament to my concerns about loss of privacy and fear of the ID being misused and possible Criminal activities it could lead to.
In 2017 the Supreme Court of India gave its verdict after one of the longest hearings on any issue. I did my bit and appealed to the Supreme Court Judges too through an On Line Petition.
In 2019 the Aadhaar Legislation has been revised and passed by the two houses of the Parliament of India making it Legal. I am no Legal Eagle so my Opinion carries no weight except with people opposed to the very concept.
In 2019, this Blog now just captures on a Daily Basis list of Articles Published on anything to do with Aadhaar as obtained from Daily Google Searches and nothing more. Cannot burn the midnight candle any longer.
"In Matters of Conscience, the Law of Majority has no place"- Mahatma Gandhi
Ram Krishnaswamy
Sydney, Australia.

Aadhaar

The UIDAI has taken two successive governments in India and the entire world for a ride. It identifies nothing. It is not unique. The entire UID data has never been verified and audited. The UID cannot be used for governance, financial databases or anything. It’s use is the biggest threat to national security since independence. – Anupam Saraph 2018

When I opposed Aadhaar in 2010 , I was called a BJP stooge. In 2016 I am still opposing Aadhaar for the same reasons and I am told I am a Congress die hard. No one wants to see why I oppose Aadhaar as it is too difficult. Plus Aadhaar is FREE so why not get one ? Ram Krishnaswamy

First they ignore you, then they laugh at you, then they fight you, then you win.-Mahatma Gandhi

In matters of conscience, the law of the majority has no place.Mahatma Gandhi

“The invasion of privacy is of no consequence because privacy is not a fundamental right and has no meaning under Article 21. The right to privacy is not a guaranteed under the constitution, because privacy is not a fundamental right.” Article 21 of the Indian constitution refers to the right to life and liberty -Attorney General Mukul Rohatgi

“There is merit in the complaints. You are unwittingly allowing snooping, harassment and commercial exploitation. The information about an individual obtained by the UIDAI while issuing an Aadhaar card shall not be used for any other purpose, save as above, except as may be directed by a court for the purpose of criminal investigation.”-A three judge bench headed by Justice J Chelameswar said in an interim order.

Legal scholar Usha Ramanathan describes UID as an inverse of sunshine laws like the Right to Information. While the RTI makes the state transparent to the citizen, the UID does the inverse: it makes the citizen transparent to the state, she says.

Good idea gone bad
I have written earlier that UID/Aadhaar was a poorly designed, unreliable and expensive solution to the really good idea of providing national identification for over a billion Indians. My petition contends that UID in its current form violates the right to privacy of a citizen, guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. This is because sensitive biometric and demographic information of citizens are with enrolment agencies, registrars and sub-registrars who have no legal liability for any misuse of this data. This petition has opened up the larger discussion on privacy rights for Indians. The current Article 21 interpretation by the Supreme Court was done decades ago, before the advent of internet and today’s technology and all the new privacy challenges that have arisen as a consequence.

Rajeev Chandrasekhar, MP Rajya Sabha

“What is Aadhaar? There is enormous confusion. That Aadhaar will identify people who are entitled for subsidy. No. Aadhaar doesn’t determine who is eligible and who isn’t,” Jairam Ramesh

But Aadhaar has been mythologised during the previous government by its creators into some technology super force that will transform governance in a miraculous manner. I even read an article recently that compared Aadhaar to some revolution and quoted a 1930s historian, Will Durant.Rajeev Chandrasekhar, Rajya Sabha MP

“I know you will say that it is not mandatory. But, it is compulsorily mandatorily voluntary,” Jairam Ramesh, Rajya Saba April 2017.

August 24, 2017: The nine-judge Constitution Bench rules that right to privacy is “intrinsic to life and liberty”and is inherently protected under the various fundamental freedoms enshrined under Part III of the Indian Constitution

"Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the World; indeed it's the only thing that ever has"

“Arguing that you don’t care about the right to privacy because you have nothing to hide is no different than saying you don’t care about free speech because you have nothing to say.” -Edward Snowden

In the Supreme Court, Meenakshi Arora, one of the senior counsel in the case, compared it to living under a general, perpetual, nation-wide criminal warrant.

Had never thought of it that way, but living in the Aadhaar universe is like living in a prison. All of us are treated like criminals with barely any rights or recourse and gatekeepers have absolute power on you and your life.

Announcing the launch of the # BreakAadhaarChainscampaign, culminating with events in multiple cities on 12th Jan. This is the last opportunity to make your voice heard before the Supreme Court hearings start on 17th Jan 2018. In collaboration with @no2uidand@rozi_roti.

UIDAI's security seems to be founded on four time tested pillars of security idiocy

1) Denial

2) Issue fiats and point finger

3) Shoot messenger

4) Bury head in sand.

God Save India

Thursday, April 5, 2018

13179 - India Loves Data but Fails to Protect It - New York Times

OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR


India Loves Data but Fails to Protect It


A woman had her irises scanned for inclusion in India's national biometric database, at a village in Rajasthan, in 2013.
Credit
Mansi Thapliyal/Reuters
By Rahul Bhatia

Mr. Bhatia is a journalist. He lives in Mumbai.

April 3, 2018
MUMBAI, India — The Indian government is in thrall of the dazzle and promise of technology, seeing in it a vehicle to overcome the inefficiencies of its humongous bureaucratic apparatus. Shortly before coming to power in 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi positioned himself as a digital governance evangelist.

A few months into his tenure, the Indian government began using biometric devices to tell on government employees who didn’t turn up for work. The state of Gujarat, which Mr. Modi had ruled for more than a decade, took to using biometrics to red-pen students who skipped school. Mr. Modi has argued that digital payments will check “black money” — the Indian term for unaccounted, often illegally acquired wealth — and other forms of corruption.

Under Mr. Modi’s government, Aadhaar, India’s enormous biometric identification system, which was initially promoted as a voluntary program to refine the delivery of public services and curb corruption, is increasingly seen as necessary for public and private services — giving birth in a hospital, enrolling a child in preschool, collecting your college degree, maintaining a telephone connection or a bank account, and collecting a death certificate. The government seems to be in a war of attrition with its citizens, breaking down their resistance to the biometric identification program.


Mr. Modi, who has spoken relentlessly of his dream of a digital India and flaunted the miracle of technology by appearing in public as a three-dimensional hologram in numerous places at the same time, has described data as “real wealth” that would confer “hegemony” on “whoever acquires and controls” it.

But alarming gaps in India’s information security infrastructure, government departments and the Unique Identification Authority of India — the federal agency running the Aadhaar project — have exposed the private data of several million Indians on numerous occasions over the last two years.

The chasm between India’s digital governance aspirations and its ability to protect that data is visible at the very top of the governance pyramid. In 2015, Mr. Modi offered his millions of followers the “unique opportunity to receive messages and emails directly from the prime minister” by downloading the Narendra Modi mobile app. “No intermediaries, no media, no officials, no red tape,” it promised. The Android app alone was downloaded over five million times.

The trust those millions of citizens invested in Mr. Modi’s personal app seems to have been violated. In late March, a French security researcher discovered that the Narendra Modi app shared user data with an American company without the consent of its users. An investigation by The Indian Express newspaper revealed the invasiveness of the Modi app: it asked permission from its users to access their photographs, contacts, location data, cameras and microphones. A day after the revelation, the app’s privacy policy was changed.

Around the same time, ZDNet, a technology website, reported that a webpage hosted by Indane, a liquefied petroleum gas company owned by the Indian government, inadvertently exposed the names, bank details and Aadhaar numbers of over half a billion Indians to anyone with the right technical skills.

Karan Saini, a New Delhi-based security researcher who found the vulnerability on a late-night bug hunt, realized that he could make thousands of requests with random Aadhaar numbers every minute through the program and extract information each time the database responded with a match.

The Unique Identification Authority of India, which runs the Aadhaar project, insisted that its own database had not been breached and said that it was “contemplating legal action” against the publication. The response was in keeping with the agency’s practice of filing court cases and sending legal notices to reporters and security researchers who shine a torch on the ease with which unauthorized people can access the data it collects.

Nandan Nilekani, the technology entrepreneur who oversaw the creation of Aadhaar in 2009 under the Congress Party-led government, recently raised the possibility of Indians selling their data for easier credit and better health care. Such idealism lives beside the reality of a society that’s largely digitally illiterate, where consent is not fully understood.

Every week brings new revelations about the considerable gaps in India’s digital infrastructure. Compounding the anxieties is the failure of the Indian government agencies to act on these findings when alerted by researchers.

ZDNet informed the National Informatics Center, which builds information technology infrastructure for the government. The agency didn’t reply. The publication informed Indane executives as well as the officials overseeing Aadhaar, but they did nothing. According to Mr. Saini, ZDNet also informed the Indian Consulate in New York, but the data remained exposed.

Aadhaar officials insist that their primary database is safe and that it hasn’t been breached. They are willfully missing the point. India’s federal Ministry of Rural Development exposed details of nearly 16 million Aadhaar numbers. A database of unorganized workers in the southern state of Andhra Pradesh exposed the details of over 20 million workers.

Aadhaar’s database might be secure, but everything else it touches leaks like a sieve. Technology has ended up strengthening a dysfunctional bureaucracy that desires efficiency through data it cannot seem to protect. Worries about data being misused have been met with official denial and fury, but no investigations have been ordered.

Technologists describe these issues as teething troubles, bugs that will disappear as systems improve and uncertainty is gradually removed. But these instances raise concerns that the initiatives on technology and governance by the Indian government are removed from the concerns of the citizens and implemented with almost no explanation.